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Mandatory Costs By Firm Size Thresholds: Firm Location, 
Growth And Death In Sri Lanka 
 
Abstract 
Sri Lanka's Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) requires that firms with 15 or 
more workers justify layoffs and provide generous severance pay to displaced workers, with 
smaller firms being exempted. Although formally subject to TEWA, firms in Export Promotion 
Zones (EPZs) do not face the same constraints as nonEPZ firms due to size incentives and lax 
labor law enforcement in that sector.  In EPZ, 77% of firms have more than 15 employeses while 
76% of nonEPZ firms are smaller than 15 employees. Panel data on all formal sector firms 
between 1995 and 2003 shows that 80% of the size gap is from sorting of large firms into the 
EPZ.  In addition, EPZ firms grow faster and are less likely to die than comparably sized 
nonEPZ firms. Despite its intent, TEWA lowered employment.  
Keywords: Firing Cost; Employment Protection; Firm Entry; Firm Growth; Threshold; Export 
Promotion Zone; Sri Lanka. 
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1. Introduction 
As part of its effort to protect workers from job loss, Sri Lanka adopted the Termination 
of Employment of Workman Act (TEWA) in 1971.  The act aimed to limit unemployment by 
raising the cost of layoffs.  It required that each layoff of a covered worker, whether the layoff 
involved a single employee or a mass layoff, must be approved by the government. Until 2003, 
the government also determined on a case-by-case basis the level of severance pay that the firm 
was required to pay to the laid off workers. 
Since its introduction, critics have argued that the TEWA's non-transparent, 
discretionary, and costly regulations discourage employment growth, hinder reallocation of labor 
from inefficient firms to more profitable sectors, slow the introduction of new technologies, and 
increase unemployment. There is at least a prima facie case that the TEWA policy has affected 
the size distribution of firms in Sri Lanka compared to that in 15 other developing countries 
reported by Leidholm and Mead (1987).  Sixty-eight percent of Sri Lankan firms had 10 or fewer 
employees, in the top third of small firm shares in the Leidholm-Mead compilation.1  Only 12% 
of Sri Lanka firms had over 49 workers which would have given it the second smallest large firm 
share in the Leidholm-Mead listing.    However, Sri Lanka’s firms in Export Promotion Zones 
(EPZ) have a remarkably different size distribution: only 17% of the firms have 10 or fewer 
workers and 57% have more than 49.  Of all the countries for which we have size-distribution 
information, Sri Lanka's EPZ firms have the smallest fraction of workers in firms with fewer 
                                                            
 
1 Sri Lanka data were compiled from the universe of formal sector firms in Sri Lanka described later in 
the paper. 
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than 10 workers and the largest fraction of workers in firms with over 49 workers.  Meanwhile, 
the reason the overall size distribution in Sri Lanka is weighted more heavily toward small firms 
is that the nonEPZ firms are so unusually small. 
Micro-econometric analyses have shown that employment protection policies can have 
negative consequences for workers. Heckman and Pages (2000) show that in Latin America, 
more stringent job security laws are associated with lower employment and higher 
unemployment, particularly among young workers. Similarly, Besley and Burgess (2004) find 
that labor regulations in India had important adverse effects on output and employment. 
Expanding on that study, Ahsan and Pages (2009) report that regulations concerned with labor 
disputes and job security hurt covered workers. Bassanini and Duval (2006) find that changes in 
tax and labor policies explain about half of the 1982–2003 changes in unemployment among 
OECD countries. Other studies using macroeconomic data have also found negative efficiency 
effects of severance pay including Nickell and Layard (1999), Haffner et al (2001), and the 
OECD (1999). Nevertheless, these negative findings from labor market regulations are not 
universal, particularly those based on cross-section analysis (Baker et al, 2005).2   
This paper adds to this literature by identifying the impacts of the Sri Lanka TEWA on 
firm employment and growth. We exploit two sources of variation in the way firms are treated to 
identify the policy’s effects. First, the law only applies to firms with more than 14 workers, and 
so smaller firms need not comply. Second, firms in EPZ do not face the same constraints 
imposed by the TEWA. These sharp differences in policies applied to firms of different size 
                                                            
2 Freeman (2007) presents a review of both theoretical and empirical effects of labor market institutions. 
Addison and Teixeira (2001) review findings regarding the effects of employment protection legislation. 
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create several strategic options.  Firms that anticipate growing beyond 14 workers will try to sort 
into the EPZ to avoid the constraints imposed by the law.  The cost of growing beyond 14 
workers may discourage nonEPZ firms from growing.  Furthermore, the costs imposed by the 
TEWA may be large enough to drive covered firms out of business. Panel data on the cohort of 
all firms registering for business in Sri Lanka between 1995 and 2002 is used to provide 
evidence for all three possibilities. 
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find that the potential TEWA costs result 
in substantially lower firm size in the nonEPZ sector, with the differential incentives to add 
workers inside and outside the EPZ clearly limiting growth for firms well below the threshold. 
EPZ firms have a 26 percentage point larger growth probability below the 14 worker 
employment threshold and a 14 percentage point growth advantage above the threshold.  In 
addition, evidence is consistent with the view that the cost of adding a 15th worker implies a 
larger marginal cost of expansion for all nonEPZ firms below the threshold compared to nonEPZ 
firms already above the threshold, and so nonEPZ firms above the threshold have more rapid 
employment growth than nonEPZ firms below the threshold. NonEPZ firms already above the 
threshold are 21 percentage points more likely to add employees than are nonEPZ firms below 
the threshold. Finally, the results show that the biggest and most significant differences in 
survival probability (about 10 percentage point) is the higher exit rate of nonEPZ firms relative 
to EPZ firms.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an institutional background, 
highlighting the intentions of the TEWA at its introduction, and its provisions and procedures. It 
also gives a description of EPZ and nonEPZ firms and description of the data. Section 3 presents 
the model highlighting firm entry and exit decisions.  Section 4 describes the empirical section 
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focusing on the need for analysis by firm. Section 5 presents the empirical results based on the 
estimation of the multinomial model of employment growth of firms. Section 6 concludes with a 
summary and policy recommendations. 
2. Institutional Background and Data Sources 
2.1 Termination of Employment of Workmen Act  
 The TEWA was enacted at a time when Sri Lanka was pursuing isolationist economic 
policies including an import-substitution industrialization policy, stringent exchange controls, 
price controls on many commodities, and a program of nationalization of a wide-range of 
establishments (Ranaraja 2005).3 The TEWA applies to all firms employing 15 or more workers.  
For covered private firms, all terminations for any reason other than discipline are regulated by 
the TEWA, including redundancies arising from organizational restructuring and financial or 
economic constraints, temporary lay-offs, terminations as a result of the business closure, and 
even incompetence.4  A worker qualifies as long as he or she worked at least 180 days in the 12 
month period preceding the termination.  
                                                            
3 The rationale for the policy, as stated in the Industrial Policy of Ceylon (1971), was that "….the 
[Government] is pledged to the establishment of a socialist society.  This commitment calls for major changes 
in industrial policy to eliminate some of the social and economic consequences of the policy followed in the 
past few years [such as] the concentration of monopoly power in the hands of a few investors, leading to 
gross inequalities in the distribution of income and the entrenchment of privileged groups in society … [and] 
the heavy reliance of local industry on imported raw material, components and technology. . . .".  
4 Incompetence is not considered a disciplinary matter.  Even in the case of disciplinary layoffs due to 
misconduct or poor discipline, the employer must inform the worker in writing of the reasons for such 
termination before the second day after such termination, failing which, the worker is entitled to seek 
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 The TEWA requires that covered employers must seek the consent of the Commissioner 
General of Labor (CGL) before they are allowed to dismiss workers, even if it concerns a single 
worker. The CGL may refuse to sanction the layoff or, if permission is granted, the employer 
will be required to pay severance in an amount determined by the CGL. Over the sample period, 
the procedure by which the severance is determined was not specified in law but was subject to a 
lengthy and seemingly arbitrary deliberation.  In December 2003, the TEWA switched to a 
formula-based severance payment that is uniformly applied to all firms. While that amendment 
eliminated the ad hoc determination of the level of severance pay, the other elements of the 
policy, including the need for prior approval of layoffs, are still in place. 
In dealing with termination applications by employers or complaints by workers, the 
CGL has the power of a District Court to conduct inquiries, such as summoning and compelling 
the attendance of witnesses, production of records, and recording testimony. The employer must 
satisfy the CGL that terminating the identified group of workers is in the best interest of the 
employer. While the evaluation is going on, the workers continue to be paid wages and other 
benefits until the CGL makes a decision, even where there is no work to be done. The final order 
of the CGL does not take into consideration the wages paid by the employer during the inquiry 
period. Data for 2003 confirm that the TEWA procedure is a very lengthy one - the average 
processing time of employer applications was 9.8 months, and it exceeded one year in more than 
25 percent of cases (World Bank 2007). 
Severance pay was quite generous. During 2002–03, the severance averaged nearly 2 
times the monthly salary per year of service, and the multiple could rise as high as 6 times the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
redress under the TEWA on the basis that the termination of his services was not for disciplinary reasons.  
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monthly salary.  Judged by international standards, this level of TEWA severance is extremely 
high. Using 2002 data, a year for which we have some data on individual compensation, we can 
infer the relationship between generosity of payments and years of service with the firm. A Sri 
Lankan worker with 20 years of service received an average severance package equal to 29 
months of wages. In contrast, the average severance was 16 months of wages in other Asian 
countries, 12 months in Latin America, 7 months in Africa, 6 months in the OECD, and 4 
months in transition countries. Sri Lankan workers with shorter duration of prior service were 
also awarded much more generous level of severance pay than workers in other countries. Since 
the switch to the fixed severance formula in December 2003, the program has become even more 
generous (World Bank, 2007). 
The high turnover costs imposed by the TEWA have led to a relatively small number of 
applications for separations by employers. Between 2000 and 2003, of more than 80 thousand 
covered firms, annual filings for the right to initiate a separation varied from 71 to 105 
applications (World Bank, 2007).  Less than half of these cases were concluded by the order of 
the commissioner because they were settled "voluntarily", whether because the firm withdrew 
the application or induced the worker to retire voluntarily with retirement packages that ranged 
from 6 to 45 months of wages.  As is apparent, it is difficult for firms to avoid the costs of the 
TEWA. Inflexible labor regulations were one of the five most commonly cited business 
challenges reported by urban firms in Sri Lanka.5  
                                                            
5 The others were an unreliable supply of electricity; uncertain government policy; macroeconomic 
instability; and the high cost of obtaining external financing (World Bank, 2005). 
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 Firms in EPZ were reported to be given a preferential treatment that allowed them to 
limit or avoid the costs of the TEWA.  Because EPZ firms were technically subject to the same 
regulations, the extent of the lax enforcement is difficult to quantify, but any preferential 
treatment should be apparent when comparing EPZ firm personnel decisions relative to those of 
nonEPZ firms.  In addition, EPZ firms were eligible for many Board of Investments (BOI) 
incentives that rewarded firm growth. The size distribution of firms inside and outside the EPZ is 
summarized in Table 1.  Large firms are atypically located in EPZ. Only 22.5% of EPZ firms 
have fewer than 14 workers compared to 75.6% of nonEPZ firms! In contrast, the EPZ firms are 
over 3 times more likely than nonEPZ firms to have grown beyond the threshold employment 
level. It certainly appears that the incentives to grow must differ between the two groups of 
firms. 
 Table 1 also shows that there are apparent differences in the probability that firms 
increase or decrease their workforce. NonEPZ firms are much more likely than EPZ firms to 
reduce or maintain their current employment level, regardless of size. EPZ firms are much more 
likely to add to their employment base. The largest contrast in probability of employment growth 
is below the threshold: the smallest EPZ firms are twice as likely to increase employment 
compared to nonEPZ firms.  If it is true that the cost of hiring is lower for EPZ firms, then the 
pattern of employment growth and decline would differ between EPZ and non-EPZ firms. 
 In Figure 1, we illustrate the probability of firm employment growth and decline in EPZ 
and nonEPZ firms around the 14-15 employee threshold.  Immediately we see that EPZ firms are 
more likely to grow and nonEPZ firms are more likely to shrink at all firm sizes, an outcome that 
will prove consistent with the theory.  NonEPZ firms are modestly more likely to both shrink and 
grow above the threshold, compared to nonEPZ firms below the threshold.  In other settings, 
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small firms are the most likely to both grow and shrink and so we would expect these lines to 
slope downward absent any constraints on firm choice (Evans, 1987; Cabral, 1995; Arkolakis, 
2013).  The patterns for EPZ firms are harder to discern due to relatively small numbers at each 
firm size.  It appears that EPZ firms are also more likely to grow above the threshold but there is 
no obvious change in the probability of firm shrinkage around the threshold. 
 At 14 workers where the 15th worker would trigger compliance with the TEWA, for EPZ 
firms the probability of employment growth decreases and the probability of firm employment 
decline increases.  NonEPZ firms have the same pattern but the difference is only a few 
percentage points.  The lack of massing at 14 employees outside the EPZ may seem surprising.  
However, firms wanting to avoid the TEWA would be expected to remain below 15 employees, 
but their constrained optimum employment choice may not be exactly at 14 workers.  As a result, 
the TEWA would be expected to create higher probability of firms shrinking above the threshold 
and lower probability of firms growing below the threshold, a result that is supported by the 
patterns in Figure 1. Moreover, data measurement errors (see above) may also contribute to less 
pronounced differences in observed behavior at the threshold. 
 To further isolate the effect of the TEWA, we need to remove the effects of firm 
observed and unobserved productivity attributes from the analysis.  In addition, the TEWA effect 
will be spread across firm decisions to expand, remain at current size, or shrink ion the face of 
external shocks.  That will require a more structured analysis of the data. 
2.2 Data Description 
To test for differences in firm location, growth and decline between EPZ and nonEPZ 
sectors, we make use of a unique panel data set that includes annual employment data for 80,560 
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firms in Sri Lanka over the 1995-2003 periods. The period coincides with a consistent set of 
restrictions on layoffs.  Those policies were relaxed modestly at the end of 2003. The data are 
compiled by the Sri Lanka Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) on all private sector firms and 
workers paying contributions to the fund. All registered firms regardless of size are required to 
pay contributions for their workers. The data are maintained by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
The data are quite limited, however. Apart from the number of workers employed during 
the year, the only other information contained in the database is the firm's name and region: each 
firm is designated as having a base in one of 24 regions. The name allows us to identify which 
firms belong to an EPZ. The Sri Lankan Board of Investment provided us a list of names for 
firms that operate in EPZs. We matched these names with 1,124 firms in the EPF list, and these 
firms comprise our EPZ group. 
The EPF data are not free of problems. The data set only contains workers for whom the 
firm paid contributions during the year. If for whatever reason such contributions are not paid, 
the true number of workers in the firm will deviate from the number reported to the EPF. The 
most frequent reason for such discrepancies is the presence of financial difficulties that prevent a 
firm from paying contributions in the current year. Even delayed payments are not used to 
correct the data retrospectively. Therefore, these employment numbers will only reflect the 
contemporaneously reported number of workers for whom the firm is making an EPF 
contribution. The frequency or magnitude of this measurement error is not known. 
Also, the nature of the data does not allow us to differentiate between quits and layoffs 
and so we assume that any net loss of workers is due to layoffs. This seems reasonable, as 
workers who quit will presumably be replaced, resulting in no employment loss. We will discuss 
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further in the empirical section on how we exploit the nature of the data to understand firm size 
decision. 
The data also provide information on firms in different years. We make use of the 
longitudinal nature of the data to specifically identify cohorts of firms and follow their evolution 
over time. Thus firms that do not make contributions in 1995 but started paying contribution in 
1996 are considered to be one cohort and are followed until 2003. The same is done for 
subsequent years. The identification of different cohorts in the data has the advantage of 
reducing heterogeneity and provides for a simple test of selection to explain firm size distribution 
and location in EPZ or nonEPZ region.  
As the summary data in Table 1 reveal, there are substantial differences in average firm 
size and growth patterns consistent with differences in the marginal cost of hiring across the EPZ 
and nonEPZ regions. To evaluate the strength of that correlation more formally, we next propose 
a theoretical model to understand firm entry and exit decision. 
3. Firm entry decisions: How much of the gap in size distribution between EPZ and 
nonEPZ firms is due to sorting by firm size at entry? 
 
3.1  Theory 
Firms face two interrelated decisions at the time of entry designated by subscript 0: 
whether to locate in an EPZ zone and how much labor ሺL0ሻ and capital ሺK0ሻ to employ.  We 
assume that there is a fixed entry cost,	F0EPZ, that firms incur from attaining EPZ status. These 
costs would include all official and under-the-table costs of applying for and attaining EPZ status 
plus any additional business expenses associated with location or entry.6 In exchange, the firm 
                                                            
6 We should note that we have no evidence that the application for EPZ status is anything but above 
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receives benefits from alleged lax enforcement of the TEWA and preferential tax treatment and 
exemption from export duties applied to worker output.  That distinction sets up the comparison 
between EPZ and nonEPZ firms for the empirical work.   
We summarize the distinction with a parameter δk	that measures the cost of compliance 
with the TEWA net of any benefits from being in the EPZ.  The superscript k denotes the cost of 
compliance in E: EPZ or N: nonEPZ. The measure of δ௞ is a positive or negative proportional 
markup over the wage.  If the firm is nonEPZ, then	δk൒0, with a positive markup if the firm has 
more than 14 employees so that it faces possible severance and related firing costs that are 
proportional to the wage.  If the firm is in the EPZ, we expect δE൑δN because of lax enforcement 
of TEWA requirements, and δE may even be negative if the firm receives tax benefits and/or 
subsidies tied to firm size.   
All firms, EPZ or nonEPZ, have to pay market wages, ݓ଴	and so the hourly labor cost per 
worker is	w0ሺ1൅δkሻ. All nonEPZ firms with L0൏15	face δNൌ0	and pay ݓ଴	per hour for labor, 
while all nonEPZ firms with L0൒15 pay w0ሺ1൅δNሻ per hour; δN൐0. All EPZ firms pay 
w0ሺ1൅δEሻ൑w0ሺ1൅δNሻ when compared with equally sized nonEPZ firms. 
Assuming the firm’s production function takes the Cobb-Douglas form 
 Q0ൌAτ0L0αLK0αK                                             (1) 
The variable τ0	is a permanent exogenous technology shock to labor productivity that 
takes an initial value of unity.  The production parameters are defined by A > 0,	0൏αL൏1, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
board.  We are just trying to be complete in allowing for supra-normal application costs. 
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0൏αK൏1.  Setting output price at unity and cost of capital as r, the firm’s initial optimum input 
levels L0*  and K0*  are set by the first-order conditions:  
 αLAτ0L0αL‐1K0αKൌw0൫1൅δk൯      (2A) 
 αKAτ0L0αLK0αK‐1ൌr       (2B) 
An entering firm will decide on whether to enter the EPZ by comparing anticipated 
profits with and without EPZ status.  For firms with	L0* ൏15, profits are higher in the nonEPZ 
state if δE൐0, or if δE൏0	and | w0δEL0*r |< F0EPZ where the term on the left of the inequality is the 
discounted value of the stream of anticipated EPZ subsidies.  The cost advantage for small firms 
locating in the nonEPZ sector is that they are exempt from TEWA costs and also avoid 
paying	F0EPZ. For firms with	L0* ൒15, it is optimal to get EPZ status when	F0EPZ൏ δ
Nw0L0*
r , where the 
term on the right is the discounted value of the stream of anticipated TEWA payments in 
perpetuity.  Consequently, it is possible for a firm planning to have 15 or more employees to 
select the nonEPZ sector.  Presuming firms face the same market wages, capital costs, potential 
EPZ benefits, and potential TEWA costs, the firms most likely to sort into the EPZ sector have 
the largest initial employment levels, L0* .   
This simple model shows that small firms will tend to sort into nonEPZ and large firms 
into EPZ at the time of entry, conditional on prevailing wages, capital costs and technology.  
That suggests that empirical analysis of the size distribution of firms must compare firms facing 
the same prices and technologies at the time of entry.  Moreover, empirical studies have 
consistently shown that firm growth rates and death rates are initially both slow with firm age 
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and so we need to standardize firm age to generate accurate transition probabilities (Evans, 1987; 
Cabral, 1995; Arkolakis, 2013).   These arguments dictate our use of cohorts of newly born firms 
for our analysis. 
3.2  Evidence of the impact of sorting on the gap in firm size between EPZ and nonEPZ 
Table 2 provides summary information on the size distribution of firms in EPZ and 
nonEPZ regions for successive entry cohorts from 1996 through 2002.   Recall that the overall 
percentage of firms with at least 15 employees is 76% in the EPZ and 23% in the nonEPZ (see 
Table 1).  The proportion of EPZ firms already above 14 workers at entry varies between 53% 
and 70% with an average of 62%.  It is apparent that the EPZ firms quickly add workers with the 
fraction above 15 workers rising 2.5% per year averaged across the cohorts.  If 76% is taken as 
the final percentage of firms employing over 15 workers, sorting of large firms into EPZ is 
responsible for about 80% of the EPZ size distribution. 
In the nonEPZ sector, only 9% of the firms in a cohort start with at least 15 employees, 
and the fraction actually decrease through the first few years.  By 2003, 8% of these seven firm 
entry cohorts had 15 or more workers.  It is apparent that the nonEPZ firms do not grow as 
readily as the EPZ firms.  While we cannot argue with certainty that the proximate cause is the 
TEWA, the results are consistent with the predicted impact of the TEWA on firm entry 
decisions.  
There is a 53 percentage point gap between the worker distribution of EPZ and nonEPZ 
firms in the population as shown in Table 1.  The average gap at entry between large EPZ and 
nonEPZ firms is also 53 percentage points as shown in Table 2.  However, the population 
measure excludes firms that have died, while the cohort estimates at entry include all firms.  It is 
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possible that the fraction of firms with over 15 employees will grow because small firms add 
workers over time, or it may be that the fraction increases because small firms are more likely to 
die. As we will see, sorting at entry is an important source of the difference between EPZ and 
nonEPZ firm size distributions, but differential growth and death rates also play a role. 
4. Can the TEWA affect firm employment growth and death? 
 
4.1  Theory 
When firms commit to their initial capital stock and decide whether or not to enter the 
EPZ, they do not know the future path of prices and technology.  Having committed to a capital 
stock and a location, their response to these changing economic circumstances is limited to labor 
adjustments in the short run. At some future time, t, the condition setting their short-run 
employment level will be  
 αLAτtLtαL‐1K0*αK൒wt൫1൅δk൯                                         (3A) 
The firm’s optimal labor allocation is conditioned on the initial capital investment at 
entry.  It is also affected by the evolution of technology, τt, and wages, wt.7    
We let technology evolve according to:   
lnሺτtሻൌ ln ቀτt‐1ቁ൅ηത0൅ηt;	ηt~Nሺ0,	ση2ሻ                                 (3B) 
                                                            
7 The technology shock could also include innovations in the real price of output.  To economize on 
terms, we fix the output price at unity and let all changes in the value of labor time work their way 
through productivity shocks. 
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The variable ηത0 is the trend growth in technology known by all firms at the time of entry, 
but ηt	is an unforeseeable but permanent technology innovation that the firm cannot control.  
This specification for τt  presumes that the firm’s labor productivity is a random walk process 
about the trend.  We assume similarly that market wages (wt) evolve according to a random walk 
process with a known drift8 so that 
lnሺwtሻൌ ln ቀwt‐1ቁ൅ωഥ0൅ωt;	ωt~Nሺ0,	σω2 ሻ                              (3C) 
The variable ωഥ0 is the trend growth in wages known by all firms at the time of entry, but 
ωt	is an unforeseeable but permanent innovation in wages that the firm cannot control.   
We can model the changes in the firm’s employment decisions by applying 3A-C to two 
successive years and solving for the change in desired labor. From here on, we define the 
notional firm input demand that would hold at an interior solution in period t as Lt* and Kt*.  The 
form of the decision depends on whether the firm comes under the TEWA policy.  We examine 
several cases that will illustrate the range of possible responses to the TEWA system.  Recall that 
we are assuming that EPZ firms are exempt from all TEWA requirements in forming these 
responses, an assumption that we will test with the data.  
Case 1: Firm is exempt from TEWA with δNൌ0 and δE൑0	in both periods with Lt‐1* 	൏15 and 
Lt*	൏15. 
                                                            
8 Ashenfelter and Card (1982) showed that wages evolve according to an AR(1) process with first-order 
coefficient  insignificantly different from 1, and so the random walk assumption is not a radical departure 
from reality. 
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Assuming interior solutions, the change in desired labor is governed by ln ቆ LtLt‐1ቇൌ
ηt‐ωt
ሺ1‐αLሻ.  
The firm is not constrained by the severance policy and adjusts labor upward with positive labor 
productivity shocks and negative wage shocks.  If EPZ firms receive favorable subsidies so that 
δE൏0	, comparable adverse shocks are less likely to cause the left hand side of (3A) to fall below 
the right-hand side for EPZ firms compared to nonEPZ firms.  As a consequence, below the 
threshold, nonEPZ firms are more likely to shrink or less likely to expand compared to EPZ 
firms.  
Case 2:  Firm is covered by TEWA so δN൐δE 	0൏	൐  in both periods because Lt‐1* ൒15 and Lt*൒15 
Assuming interior solutions, the change in desired labor is also governed by 
ln ቆ LtLt‐1ቇൌ
ηt‐ωt
ሺ1‐αLሻ and so optimal labor demand responds as with the exempt firms in Case 1.  
However, even at their optimum labor allocations, the nonEPZ firms face a constant 
disadvantage of having higher labor costs and more distorted capital labor ratios compared to 
their EPZ competitors. As before, comparable adverse shocks are more likely to lead to 
violations of the first order condition (3A) for nonEPZ firms than EPZ firms.  In addition, even if 
they are at their optimum labor allocation, nonEPZ firm profit levels will be lower than that of 
comparably sized EPZ firms because of their higher labor costs.  As a result, above the threshold, 
nonEPZ firms are more likely to shrink and less likely to expand compared to equally sized EPZ 
firms. 
Case 3: Firm has  Lt‐1* ൏15 and considers remaining below the threshold in period t even 
though Lt*൒15  if the firm is exempt from the TEWA 
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In this case, assume first that employment in t-1 is fixed by the interior solution of 3A-C 
such that Lt‐1* ൏15.  However, in the next period, the firm’s optimal staffing would move it into 
the covered region: 
αLAτtLtαL‐1K0*αKൌwt→Lt*൒15  
αLAτtLt*αL‐1K0*αK൏wt൫1൅δkLt*൯;	∀Lt*൒15;	δ൐0  
This is the case where the firm would want to expand beyond 14 employees if it faced the 
market wage alone.  However, in moving beyond 14 employees, the firm has to pay for the 
TEWA severance system for all Lt* workers, leading to an even larger increase in the marginal 
cost of adding any workers beyond 14.  As a consequence, the firm will set their staffing at some 
second-best level Lt൏15 and where the marginal product	αLAτtLtαL‐1K0*αK൐wt.9  Because	δN൐δE, 
it is more likely that nonEPZ firms will decide not to expand beyond 14 workers compared to 
EPZ firms. 
4.2  Empirical Framework 
The discussion illustrates that the TEWA can alter the incentives for nonEPZ firms to 
expand or shrink compared to similarly sized EPZ firms.  Both above and below the threshold, 
the combination of special tax and subsidy treatments from the EPZ and the costs of compliance 
with the TEWA create conditions that increase the likelihood that nonEPZ firms will shrink or 
fail to grow compared to their EPZ counterparts.  At the threshold, nonEPZ firms are more likely 
                                                            
9 In the Cobb-Douglas formulation used here, and with the restriction that capital is fixed, the second best 
solution is to set employment at 14.  A more general specification could result in the second best 
employment level at less than 14.   
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to face additional labor costs that cause them to remain below the threshold. As we show in this 
section, these predictions can be tested with longitudinal data on cohorts of firms entering 
business at the same time.   
The use of a common startup date is important for two reasons.  First, all firms will be 
exposed to the same information on wages, technology and macroeconomic conditions, greatly 
simplifying the specification of common shocks.  Second, a sample of the universe of all starting 
firms avoids the selection bias that would exist had we been constrained to a sample of surviving 
firms in which the weakest would have been already eliminated. 
The empirical section described below can be viewed in the difference-in-differences 
framework, using firms at or above the severance threshold as the treatment group, and those 
with fewer than 14 workers and those in EPZs as control groups. The first control group follows 
naturally from the design of the TEWA system, because the regulations do not apply to firms 
employing less than 15 workers. The second control group is formed based on the assumption 
that enforcement is ineffective in EPZs, allowing firms to escape paying separation costs as 
dictated by TEWA 
Measuring the TEWA effect on probability of Firm Growth 
We begin by applying an interior solution to (3A) which defines the firm’s notional 
demand in period t as  
ሺαL‐1ሻlnLt*ൌlnሺ wt൫1൅δ
k൯
αLAτtK0
*αK ሻ        (4A) 
The first order condition for notional employment in period t+1 is 
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ሺαL‐1ሻlnLt൅1* ൌ ln ቆwt൅1൫1൅δ
k൯
αLAτt൅1K0
*αKቇൌሺαL‐1ሻlnLt*൅ωt൅1‐ηt൅1  (4B) 
where we apply (4A), (3B) and (3C).  Rearranging, we have that the change in notional 
employment from t to t+1 is  
ln ൬Lt൅1*Lt* ൰ൌ	
η0തതത	൅	ηt൅1	‐	ω0	തതതതത‐	ωt൅1
ሺ1‐αLሻ         (5) 
which means that if firm employment evolves without frictions, the change in notional 
employment will be a random walk with drift.  Employment increases with trend growth and 
unexpected innovations in technology and decreases with expected wage increases and positive 
wage shocks.  Importantly, the firm-specific Hicksian productivity factor A is differenced away, 
and so labor demand or supply shifts related to firm-specific unobservable productivity, firm 
location, or industry are held constant in the frictionless solution.  However, the constraints on 
maximization caused by the TEWA will mean that actual firm employment growth will deviate 
from the frictionless outcome.  The greater frictions in the nonEPZ sector should be apparent 
when we compare employment changes in those firms with the less constrained employment 
growth in the EPZ sector above, at and below the threshold. 
 This simple model does not take into account the stylized facts about firm growth by firm 
age and size.  Our assessment of the literature suggests that these tendencies are unlikely to cause 
faster growth in the EPZ sector.  First, as noted above, firm growth rates tend to decrease with 
firm age (Evans, 1987; Cabral, 1995; Arkolakis, 2013).  This will not bias comparisons across 
EPZ and nonEPZ firms, but it will induce a downward trend in longitudinal firm growth rates 
within the sectors.  Potentially of greater concern is a second stylized result that exporting firms 
tend to grow faster than non-exporting firms which could bias the comparison across the EPZ 
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and nonEPZ firms.  However, extensive reviews of the empirical literature by Wagner (2007, 
2012) and Singh (2010) suggest that the productivity advantage to exporting firms is driven by 
the sorting of more efficient firms into the export sector, similar to our own finding that larger 
firms enter the EPZ sector while smaller firms enter the nonEPZ sector.  In contrast, there is no 
consistent evidence that the act of exporting raises firm growth rates.  Again, these past findings 
suggest that the comparison across EPZ and nonEPZ sectors will not be biased by the act of 
exporting after controlling for the initial conditions at time of entry.  In fact, evidence suggests 
that the highest firm growth rates among exporting firms are concentrated among the very small 
firms, while larger firms have growth rates near zero (Arkolakis, 2013).  If true, the bias would 
actually go against finding faster growth rates in the EPZ sector as firm size increases. 
Actual employment changes for the ith firm are modeled as an approximation to the 
firm’s notional employment changes as  
ln ቀLit൅1Lit ቁൌβ0൅βEPZEPZi൅βL‐Eit
L‐൅βL൅EitL൅൅	 ቄγL‐EitL
‐൅γL൅EitL൅ቅ *EPZi൅  
                     ηi0തതതത	‐	ωi0തതതതത	ሺ1‐αLሻ ൅	
		ηit൅1‐		ωit൅1
ሺ1‐αLሻ         (6) 
This specification adds terms to (5) that allow differential responses to the wage and 
technology shocks depending on whether the firm is inside or outside the EPZ and whether its 
employment level lies above or below the threshold.  The constant β0 corresponds to the base 
case which is set to be the anticipated employment change at a firm with Litൌ14 in a nonEPZ 
region. The other possible employment levels in period t are indicated by a dummy variable EitL‐ 
when employment is below 14 and EitL൅when employment is above 14. The corresponding 
coefficients differentiate between employment growth effects below the threshold (βL‐) and 
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above the threshold (βL൅). The dummy variable ܧܼܲ௜  indicates that the firm is in an export 
promotion zone.  Given the other parameters, the coefficient βEPZ measures the difference in 
employment growth between EPZ and nonEPZ firms at the threshold Litൌ14. The γL‐ capture 
additional differences in employment growth between EPZ and nonEPZ below the threshold and 
γL൅ measures additional differences between the sectors above the threshold.  If EPZ firms face 
fewer frictions in employment adjustments because of partial or full immunity from the TEWA 
or other benefits associated with EPZ status, γL‐ and γL൅ will be positive and significant. The γL‐ 
and γL൅ may differ from one another if there are different relative regulatory costs between EPZ 
and nonEPZ sectors above and below the threshold.   
Our last requirement to estimate (6) is to operationalize the random walk and drift terms.  
The wage and technology trend terms are firm-specific and reflect information known at the time 
of entry.  We approximate these terms by   ηi0തതതത	‐	ωi0തതതതത	ሺ1‐αLሻ ൌ	φLlnሺLi0ሻ൅φ0 where the initial employment 
level reflects the firm’s anticipated input needs based on what the firm knew at the time of entry 
and the second term is a cohort-specific term reflecting common expectations of the drift terms 
held by all firms entering at the same time.  The second term requires that we control for a 
common fixed effect for all firms in the entry cohort.  Inclusion of these terms helps to control 
for nonrandom sorting into firm size groups across firms and across entry cohorts. 
The random walk terms are i.i.d. errors when we estimate one period employment 
changes.  We let   ϵitΛൌ 		ηit൅1‐		ωit൅1ሺ1‐αLሻ   be the composite error term in the employment change 
relationship.  If ϵitΛ is distributed extreme value, then (6) can be posed as a multinomial logit 
specification.  If we further define the term ∆Λt൅1 as a trichotomous variable and define the 
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right-hand side terms excluding ϵit as Zit' ΒΛ, the estimable variant of (6) that will yield the 
parameters of interest is 
∆Λt൅1ൌ1	if	 ln ቀLit൅1Lit ቁ ‐Zit
' ΒΛ൏	ϵitΛ  
∆Λt+1=2 if ln ቀLit+1Lit ቁ -Zit
' ΒΛ= ϵitΛ                                               (7) 
∆Λt+1=3 if ln ቀLit+1Lit ቁ -Zit
' ΒΛ> ϵitΛ  
Table 3 summarizes the identification and interpretation of the coefficients.  The first 
column shows the parameters describing firm growth for EPZ firms below, at and above the 
threshold. The second column shows the corresponding parameter estimates for nonEPZ firms. 
The first differences of the nonEPZ estimates allow us to identify β
L-
 and βL+. The double 
difference allows us to identify γ
L-
 and γL+ .  βL->0 indicates faster growth than the base case for 
nonEPZ firms below 14 workers. Similarly, βL+>0 indicates faster employment growth than the 
base case for nonEPZ firms above 14 workers. βEPZ+γL->0  indicates that EPZ firms are growing 
faster than nonEPZ firms below 14 workers and βEPZ+γL+>0  indicates that EPZ firms are 
growing faster than nonEPZ firms above 14 workers. The coefficient βEPZ tells us if EPZ firms 
grow faster than nonEPZ firms at the threshold. These coefficient estimates form the basis of our 
hypothesis tests. 
Measuring the TEWA effect on probability of Firm Death 
Even with perfect foresight, firms will not completely avoid the TEWA costs by sorting 
into or out of the EPZ.  NonEPZ firms face a labor cost disadvantage every period because 
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δN≥δE both above and below the threshold.  Because nonEPZ firms will pay an artificially high 
labor cost per hour, they will pick an inefficiently high ratio of capital per worker.  The higher 
input costs than their EPZ competitors also leave them more exposed to adverse wage or 
technology shocks, increasing the probability that nonEPZ firms will shrink or fail.   
We can test the hypothesized greater likelihood of firm death for nonEPZ firms using a 
similar specification as in (7) but with an alternative dependent variable.  The details of the 
parameterizations follow exactly from the previous section except that the expected signs are 
opposite those for firm growth.  We denote the composite error term as ϵit஌=   ηit+1-  ωit+1(1-αL)   which we 
assume is distributed extreme value. Then, we can derive a binomial logit specification for firm 
deaths which are indicated by unit values of the dichotomous variable ∆ΥT+1. Denoting the terms 
on the right-hand side of (7) excluding the error as Zit' Β஌, we can define firm deaths by  
∆Υt+1=1 if ln ቀLit+1Lit ቁ -Zit
' Β஌≤ ϵit஌  
∆Υt+1=0 if ln ቀLit+1Lit଴ቁ -Zit
' Β஌> ϵit஌                                               (8) 
where a firm death occurs when the notional reduction in staffing from year t to t+1 is 
sufficiently large that it is more profitable for the firm to exit thanType	equation	here. to remain 
in operation with reduced staffing.  If the additional costs faced by nonEPZ firms are sufficiently 
large compared to EPZ firms, then we would find negative values for βEPZ, γL- and γL+. 
5. Can the TEWA affect firm employment growth and death? 
In Table 4 and Table 5, we present the results of our estimation of the firm employment 
growth and firm death equations, estimated over the pooled firm entry cohorts from 1996 
26 
 
through 2002.  These firms are followed annually until 2003, and so their growth and decline is 
tracked from one to seven years after entry.  Constant terms for cohort year of birth are used to 
correct for the common information on macroeconomic conditions that shape anticipated price, 
wage and technology trends at the time of entry.  The firm’s initial employment level is used as a 
proxy for firm-specific information on technologies and wages that shaped the initial profit 
maximizing employment level.  These parameters are estimated, but not reported.10 
For ease of interpretation, all estimated coefficients are converted into their implied 
transition probabilities.  Therefore, all results reported in Table 4 and Table 5 reflect the 
marginal effects by EPZ or nonEPZ status of the prior year’s employment level on the 
probability of employment growth, decline, or firm death.  We report the reduced form 
coefficients in the upper panel and the lower panel presents the values of the hypotheses tests and 
the test statistics.   
Employment growth and decline inside and outside the EPZ 
The reduced form parameters give the average annual probability of employment growth 
relative to the reference firm which is a nonEPZ firm with 14 employees in year t.  Smaller EPZ 
firms are 9 percentage points more likely to add workers than the reference firm.  In contrast, 
smaller nonEPZ firms are nearly 17 percentage points less likely to add workers than a reference 
firm!  Therefore, the differential incentives to add workers inside and outside the EPZ clearly 
limit growth for firms well below the threshold.  As indicated in the theory section, there is no 
                                                            
10 In practice, our main parameters of interest were not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these 
cohort and firm-specific entry conditions.  
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reason to believe that the constrained optimal employment level for a firm facing a substantial 
added cost of employing 15 workers would be 14 workers.  This finding suggests that potential 
TEWA costs result in substantially lower firm size in the nonEPZ sector, even for firms well 
below the 14 firm threshold. 
Above the threshold, EPZ firms are 19 percentage points more likely to add workers than 
the reference nonEPZ firm with 14 workers.  In contrast, nonEPZ firms already above the 
threshold are 5 percentage points more likely to add workers than the reference firm.  Because 
firm adding a 15th worker face additional costs on all 15 workers, we would expect a larger 
marginal cost to expansion for firms at the threshold compared to those already above the 
threshold.   
Turning to the structural estimates, EPZ firms at the threshold are 12 percentage points 
more likely to add workers than the reference nonEPZ firm at the threshold, a difference that 
easily meets any standard significance criteria. The hypothesis that EPZ firms grow faster than 
comparably sized nonEPZ firms in the same entry cohort either above or below the threshold 
also passes any standard significance criteria.  These effects are not small: 26 percentage point 
larger growth probability for firms below the threshold and a 14 percentage point growth 
advantage for firms above the threshold.  This is overwhelming support of the hypothesis that 
firms in the EPZ grow faster than firms with identical initial size and year of entry in the nonEPZ 
sector.  
The TEWA costs tend to keep nonEPZ firms small.  NonEPZ firms below the threshold 
are 17 percentage points less likely to grow than are firms at the threshold, defying the tendency 
for firm growth rates to decrease with firm size.  In contrast, EPZ firms below the threshold are 
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more likely to add workers, consistent with the unconstrained pattern of firm growth by size 
found elsewhere.  nonEPZ firms that manage to cross the threshold are 5% more likely to grow 
than the firms at the threshold who face very large marginal costs of the 15th worker, and are 21 
percentage points more likely to add employees than are nonEPZ firms below the threshold.  In 
contrast, there are no significant differences between employment growth probabilities of EPZ 
firms at or above the threshold.  The differences in growth probability between EPZ above and 
below the threshold are only marginally significant.  In short, growth rates for EPZ firms are 
quite similar to the unconstrained random walk with drift, while the pattern for nonEPZ firms is 
very different from the typical pattern of the fastest growth rates concentrated among the 
smallest firms. 
Firm death inside and outside the EPZ 
Table 5 reports the marginal probabilities of firm exit by current firm size and sector.  
EPZ firms below and above the threshold are 7 and 9 percentage points less likely to exit in a 
given year compared to comparably sized nonEPZ firms of the same vintage.  At the threshold, 
EPZ firms are 3 percentage points less likely to exit but the estimate is not precise.  NonEPZ 
firms below the threshold are the most likely to die at a 2 percentage point elevated exit rate per 
year.  NonEPZ firms above the threshold have the same exit probability as firms at the threshold. 
The structural hypothesis tests demonstrate a higher risk of death for almost all nonEPZ 
firms, regardless of size.  The one-tailed test that EPZ firms are more likely to survive than 
nonEPZ firms at the threshold is not definitive.  However, firms below the threshold have a 10 
percentage point higher probability of death than comparably sized EPZ frims.  For firms above 
the threshold, again there is a 10 percentage point higher probability of exit for nonEPZ firms.  
All of these estimates easily passes critical values. Greater exposure to the TEWA expenses and 
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other disadvantages of nonEPZ firms relative to EPZ firms of comparable initial size and vintage 
increases significantly the likelihood that nonEPZ firms will fail.   
For both EPZ and nonEPZ sectors, there is a small advantage of size – about a two 
percentage point lower risk of death per year relative to smaller firms in the same sector. 
However, the difference is only statistically significant for the nonEPZ sector.  In addition, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a uniform firm survival probability above and below the 
threshold in the EPZ sector.  Therefore, survival probability does not change significantly by 
firm size in the EPZ, but small nonEPZ firms do face a higher probability of failure compared to 
other nonEPZ firms.  However, the biggest and most significant differences in survival 
probability is the higher exit rate in nonEPZ relative to EPZ firms of equal initial size and 
vintage. 
Placebo Tests 
We reestimated the model of firm employment growth used in Table 4 but using alternate 
artificial threshold sizes of Lit ൌ 20  and Lit ൌ 30.  For these placebo regressions, we limit the 
sample to firms above 14 workers to take out the effect of the actual threhold.  The results are 
reported in Table 6 with the Table 4 results repeated in the first column.  The results in column 1 
are very different from those in the last two columns.  Probability of firm growth in the nonEPZ 
sector below the threshold are now not significantly different from the probability at the placibo 
threshold (at the threshold of 20) or positive (at the threshold of 30) rather than negative.  The 
differences in growth rates for nonEPZ firms above and below the threshold are now only 4-5 
percentage points compared to the 21 percentage points using the true thresholds.  However, the 
EPZ firms continue to have a growth advantage over their nonEPZ counterparts consistent with 
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the expected lower cost of employment expansion in the EPZ sector at all employment levels.  In 
addition, EPZ firms grow at equal rates above and below the placebo thresholds which is 
consistent with the expected growth pattern for the EPZ sector for firms above the true threshold.  
In short, the EPZ firms continue to act as expected with the placebo thresholds while the nonEPZ 
firms look markedly different from their behavior about the true  thresholds.  These findings 
buttress the validity of the findings in Table 4. 
Conclusion 
 Numerous studies have explained the effect of labor market restriction on unemployment, 
employment growth and wage inequality in OECD countries. This study extends this inquiry to 
the case of employment protection in a developing country context, namely the TEWA in Sri 
Lanka.  The program imposes severance costs on firms with 15 or more workers in Sri Lanka, 
but not on smaller firms or firms in export promotion zones (EPZ).  
     We find that the size distribution of firms differs dramatically across the EPZ and 
nonEPZ sectors, with 76% of nonEPZ firms having less than 15 workers while 77% of EPZ 
firms have at least 15 employees.  Using panel data on employment in the universe of formal 
sector firms in Sri Lanka from 1995 to 2003, we found evidence that 62% of EPZ firms open for 
business with at least 15 employees compared to only 9% of nonEPZ firms.  That implies that 
disproportionate sorting of large firms into EPZ explains about 80% of the gap in firm size 
distribution across EPZ and nonEPZ sectors.  Moreover, EPZ firms above the threshold are 14 
percentage points more likely to add workers than are comparably sized nonEPZ firms, while 
EPZ firms below the threshold have an astounding 26 percentage point higher probability of 
growing relative to their nonEPZ counterparts.  While the large firm share of nonEPZ firms rises 
over time, even that turns out to be due to poor outcomes in the nonEPZ sector.  Small nonEPZ 
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firms are slightly more likely to exit than nonEPZ firms which lowers the small firm share of all 
nonEPZ firms over time.  In fact, small and large nonEPZ firms are 10 percentage points more 
likely to die than are their EPZ counterparts of like size and vintage. 
     The totality of the evidence suggests that the TEWA restrictions on firing that were 
supposed to increase employment stability had exactly the opposite result. By imposing a tax on 
firm growth, the system causes nonEPZ firms to inefficiently limit employment, increasing the 
odds that the firm will fail.  While large firms atypically sort into the EPZ and avoid the 
regulatory expenses, a significant number of firms are caught by the regulatory costs.  Results 
suggest that these firms would hire more workers and be more likely to succeed if nonEPZ and 
EPZ firms operated under the same, more liberal rules regarding the costs of hiring and firing. 
32 
 
References 
Addison, J. T., and P. Teixeira. 2001. “The Economics of Employment Protection.” IZA 
Discussion Paper no. 381. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor, October. 
Ahsan, A. & C. Pages. 2009. “Are All Labor Regulations Equal? Evidence from Indian 
Manufacturing.” Journal of Comparative Economics, 37(1), 62-75. 
Arkolakis, Costas. 2013. “A Unified Theory of Firm Selection and Growth.” Yale University 
Working Paper. New Haven, CT. 
Ashenfelter, Orley and David Card. 1982. “Time Series Representations of Economic Variables 
and Alternative Models for the Labour Market.”  The Review Economic Studies, 49 (1), 
761-781. 
Baker, D., Glyn, A, Howell, D and J. Schmitt. 2005. “Labor Market Institutions and 
Unemployment: A Critical Assessment of the Cross-Country Evidence.” In Fighting 
Unemployment: The Limits of Free Market Orthodoxy, ed. David R. Howell. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bassanini, A. and R. Duval. 2006. “Employment Patterns In OECD Countries: Reassessing the 
Role of Policies and Institutions.” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 
486. 
Besley, T., and R. Burgess. 2004. “Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? 
Evidence from India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1). 91-134. 
Cabral, Luis. 1995. "Sunk Costs, Firm Size and Firm Growth." The Journal of Industrial 
Economics 43(2):161-172. 
33 
 
Evans, David S. 1987. "The Relationship Between Firm Growth, Size, and Age: Estimates for 
100 Manufacturing Industries." The Journal of Industrial Economics 35(4): 567-581. 
Freeman R.B. 2008. “Labor Market Institutions around the World.” In Paul Blyton, Nicolas 
Bacon, Jack Fiorito, and Edmund Heery eds. The SAGE Handbook of Industrial 
Relations. SAGE Publications Ltd. London. 
Haffner, R., Nickell, S., Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta, S., and G. Zoega. 2001. “European Integration, 
Liberalization and Labour Market Performance.” In Giuseppe Bertola, Tito Boeri and 
Giuseppe Nicoletti eds. Welfare and Employment in a United Europe,. The MIT Press. 
Cambridge, MA. 
Heckman, J.J., and C. Pages. 2000. “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin 
American Labor Markets.” Economia:The Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean 
Economic Association 1(1): 109-54. 
Leidholm, C. and M. Donald. 1987. “Small-Scale Industries in Developing Countries: Empirical 
Evidence and Policy Implications.” International Development Paper 9, Agricultural 
Economics Department, Michigan State University. 
Nickell, S. and R. Layard. 1999. “Labor Market Institutions and Economic Performance.” In 
Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. Ashenfelter, O and Card, D. (Edition 1, volume 3, 
chapter 46, pages 3029-3084), Elsevier.  Amsterdam. 
OECD. 1999. “OECD Employment Outlook 1999.” OECD, Paris. 
Ranaraja, S. 2005. “The Functioning of the Termination of Employment Act Of 1971.” World 
Bank, HDNSP, processed. 
34 
 
Singh, Tarlok. 2010.  "Does international trade cause economic growth? A survey." The World 
Economy 33(11): 1517-1564. 
 
Wagner, Joachim. 2007. "Exports and productivity: A survey of the evidence from firm‐level 
data." The World Economy 30(1): 60-82. 
Wagner, Joachim. 2012. "International trade and firm performance: a survey of empirical studies 
since 2006." Review of World Economics 148(2): 235-267. 
 
World Bank. 2005. “Sri Lanka: Improving The Rural And Urban Investment Climate.” World 
Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, South Asia Region. 
World Bank. 2007. “Sri Lanka: Strengthening Social Protection.” World Bank, Human 
Development Unit, South Asia Region, Report No. 38197-LK. 
  
35 
 
Table 1 Distribution of Sri Lanka firms by initial size, change in employment over the 
years, and EPZ status (%), 1995 – 2003. 
EPZ Firms Percent of sample Shrink Stay Grow Total 
Less than 14 workers 22.5 29.3 26.7 44.0 100.0 
14 workers 1.1 45.8 13.6 40.7 100.0 
More than 14 workers 76.4 45.4 2.2 52.4 100.0 
Total EPZ workers = 5,441      
      
non EPZ Firms Percent of sample Shrink Stay Grow Total 
Less than 14 workers 75.6 37.2 40.8 22.0 100.0 
14 workers 1.2 53.9 13.2 32.9 100.0 
More than 14 workers 23.2 55.8 5.1 39.1 100.0 
Total nonEPZ workers = 
320,866 
     
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the universe of all formal sector firms in Sri Lanka, 1995-2003. 
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone
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Table 2: Distribution of EPZ and non EPZ firms at entry (1996) and the end of sample (2003) 
  
% large at 
entry, EPZ 
% large in 
2003, EPZ 
 % large at 
entry, 
nonEPZ 
% large in 
2003, nonEPZ
% of large firms 
at entry that is 
EPZ 
% of large firms 
in 2003 that is 
EPZ 
% of firms in 
EPZ at entry 
1996 55 71 11 9 6 10 1 
1997 67 72 12 10 7 9 1 
1998 62 68 10 8 9 12 2 
1999 65 67 8 7 10 11 1 
2000 70 76 11 10 9 10 1 
2001 53 65 8 7 8 10 1 
2002 60 65 8 8 9 11 1 
Average 62 69 9 8 8 10 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based n the universe of all formal sector firms in Sri Lanka, 1995-2003. 
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone.
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Table 3: Parameters controlling the probability of employment growth by type of firms 
 Type of firm  
  Employment in 
period t 
EPZ Non EPZ Difference 
Firm employment growth effects below the threshold 
EitL‐ൌ1:Lit‐1൑13  βL‐൅βEPZ൅γL‐ βL‐ βEPZ൅γL‐ 
Litൌ14 βEPZ reference βEPZ 
 Difference  βL‐൅γL‐ βL‐ γL‐ 
Firm employment growth effects above the threshold 
EitL൅ൌ1:	Lit൒15 βL൅൅βEPZ൅γL൅ βL൅ βEPZ൅γL൅ 
Litൌ14 βEPZ reference βEPZ 
 Difference  βL൅൅γL൅ βL൅ γL൅ 
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone 
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Table 4: Reduced form and structural estimates of the probability of employment growth 
conditional on prior employment level inside and outside Enterprise Protection Zones as 
per equation (6) using Probit model with cluster robust standard errors. 
 
Reduced form parameters: ۳۾܈ܑ ൌ ૚ Marginal Effecta  
Lit≤13,	EitL‐ൌ1:		βL‐൅βEPZ൅γL‐   0.089** (0.023) 
Litൌ14:			βEPZ  0.123 
(0.079)  
Lit≥15,	EitL൅ൌ1:		βL൅൅βEPZ൅γL൅  0.190** 
(0.019) 
Reduced form parameters: EPZiൌ0  
Lit≤13,	EitL‐ൌ1:		βL‐    -0.166** (0.015) 
Litൌ14:			reference  
Lit≥15,	EitL൅ൌ0:		βL൅   0.048** 
(0.013) 
Structural estimates 
 Hypothesis: Relative to nonEPZ firms of like size and vintage… Marginal Effectb
 βEPZ൐0: EPZ firms grow faster at the threshold 0.123** 
(224.1) 
βEPZ൅γL‐ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster below the threshold 0.255** 
(160.7) 
βEPZ൅γL൅ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster above the threshold 0.142** 
(2952) 
Hypothesis: Relative to same sector firms below the threshold …  
βL൅‐βL‐൐0:	 nonEPZ firms grow faster above the threshold 0.214** (21.2) 
ሺβL൅൅γL൅ሻ‐ቀβL‐൅γL‐ቁ൐0: EPZ firms grow faster above the threshold 0.101** (41.5) 
Hypothesis: Relative to EPZ firms at the threshold….  
γL‐ൌ0 :  EPZ firms grow at a different rate below the threshold  0.133* 
(3.5) 
γL൅ൌ0 : EPZ firms grow at a different rate above the threshold 0.020 
(0.01) 
Log-likelihood value of  -94817.0 with 79% of the observation predicted correctly 
a Marginal effect reproted with attached standard error in parenthesis 
b Marginal effect reported with attached Chi-square statistic in parentheses.  Critical value is 3.84 at the .05 
significance level. 
*significance at the 0.1 level.  **significance at the .05 level.  
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone 
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Table 5: Reduced form and structural estimates of the probability of firm death 
conditional on prior employment level inside and outside Enterprise Protection Zones as 
per equation (7) using Probit model with cluster robust standard errors. 
Reduced form parameters: EPZiൌ1 Marginal Effecta
Lit≤13,	EitL‐ൌ1:		βL‐൅βEPZ൅γL‐  -0.073** (0.011) 
Litൌ14:			βEPZ  -0.032 
(0.062) 
Lit≥15,	EitL൅ൌ1:		βL൅൅βEPZ൅γL൅  -0.093** 
(0.009) 
Reduced form parameters: EPZiൌ0  
Lit≤13,	EitL‐ൌ1:		βL‐   0.023** (0.011) 
Litൌ14:			reference  
Lit≥15,	EitL൅ൌ0:		βL൅   0.004 
(0.012) 
Structural estimates 
 Hypothesis: Relative to nonEPZ firms of like size and vintage … Marginal Effectb
 βEPZ൏0: EPZ firms survive more readily at the threshold -0.032** 
(66.4) 
βEPZ൅γL‐ < 0: EPZ firms survive more readily below the threshold -0.096** 
(72.6) 
ߚா௉௓ ൅ ߛ௅శ < 0: EPZ firms survive more readily above the threshold -0.096** 
(30.1) 
Hypothesis: Relative to firms in the same sector below the threshold …  
βL൅‐βL‐൏0:	 nonEPZ firms survive more readily above the threshold -0.022 (1.22) 
ሺβL൅൅γL൅ሻ‐ቀβL‐൅γL‐ቁ൏0: EPZ firms survive more readily above the threshold -0.020
 
(0.266) 
Hypothesis: Relative to EPZ firms at the threshold….  
γL‐ൌ0 :  EPZ firms below the threshold have a different survival rate -0.064 
(1.22) 
γL൅ൌ0 : EPZ firms above the threshold have a different survival rate -0.065 
(1.66) 
Log-likelihood value of  -77956.7 with 85% of the observation predicted correctly. 
a Marginal effect reproted with attached standard error in parenthesis 
b Marginal effect reported with attached Chi-square statistic in parentheses.  Critical value is 3.84 at the .05 
significance level. 
*significance at the 0.1 level.  **significance at the .05 level.  
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone 
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Table 6: Reduced form and structural estimates of the probability of employment growth 
conditional on prior employment level inside and outside Enterprise Protection Zones as per 
equation (6) using Probit model with cluster robust standard errors. 
Reduced form parameters: ۳۾܈ܑ ൌ ૚ T=14a   
from Table 4 
Placebo 1: T=20a 
Sample excludes 
Lit ൏ 15  
Placebo 2: T=30 a 
Sample excludes 
Lit ൏ 15 
Lit≤	T‐1,	EitL‐ൌ1:		βL‐൅βEPZ൅γL‐   0.09** (0.02) 
 0.23*** 
(0.05) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
LitൌT:			βEPZ  0.12* 
(0.08)  
0.31*** 
(0.10) 
0.36*** 
(0.10) 
Lit≥	T൅1,	EitL൅ൌ1:		βL൅൅βEPZ൅γL൅  0.19** 
(0.02) 
0.20*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
Reduced form parameters: EPZiൌ0    
Lit≤	T‐1,	EitL‐ൌ1:		βL‐   -0.17** (0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Litൌ	T:			reference  
Lit≥	T൅1,	EitL൅ൌ0:		βL൅   0.048** 
(0.01) 
0.049*** 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
Structural estimates   
 Hypothesis: Relative to nonEPZ firms of like size and vintageb 
 βEPZ൐0: EPZ firms grow faster at the 
threshold 
0.123** 
(224) 
0.31** 
(5.7) 
0.36** 
(18) 
βEPZ൅γL‐ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster 
below the threshold 
0.255** 
(161) 
0.219** 
(21.63) 
0.21** 
(49.4) 
βEPZ൅γL൅ > 0: EPZ firms grow faster 
above the threshold 
0.142** 
(2952) 
 0.15** 
 (131) 
 0.14** 
 (101) 
Hypothesis: Relative to same sector firms below the threshold …b 
βL൅‐βL‐൐0:	 nonEPZ firms grow faster 
above the threshold 
0.214** 
(21) 
 0.048** 
(22.6) 
0.04 ** 
(17.65) 
ሺβL൅൅γL൅ሻ‐ቀβL‐൅γL‐ቁ൐0: EPZ firms 
grow faster above the threshold 
0.101** 
(42) 
 -0.03 
(0.60) 
 -0.03 
(.79) 
Hypothesis: Relative to EPZ firms at the threshold….b 
γL‐ൌ0 :  EPZ firms grow at a different 
rate below the threshold  
0.133* 
(3.5) 
-0.08 
(0.14) 
-0.15 
(3.03) 
γL൅ൌ0 : EPZ firms grow at a different 
rate above the threshold 
0.020 
(0.01) 
-0.15 
(0.43) 
-0.22 
(1.63) 
a Marginal effect reproted with attached standard error in parenthesis 
b Marginal effect reported with attached Chi-square statistic in parentheses.  Critical value is 3.84 at the .05 
significance level. 
*significance at the 0.1 level,  **significance at the .05 level, ***significance at the .01 level. 
EPZ: Export Promotion Zone  
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Figure 1:  Probability of firm employment growth and decline above and below the 14 worker 
threshold, by firm size and EPZ status, 1995-2003 averages 
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